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1. Introduction 
“Language in language evolution research” (Wacewicz et al., 2020) is a valuable 
synthesis of recent research on the origin and evolution of language. Its central 
message, however, is surprising: instead of encouraging the clearest possible 
specification of the object of study in research on language evolution, that is, a 
specification of what evolves when we say that language evolved, the authors 
argue that the lack of agreement on what language is has served to facilitate the 
significant progress made in research on language evolution over the last decade. 
 The absence of a more or less hegemonic theory of language (within and 
outside linguistics) may have made easier the proliferation of hypotheses, data 
sources, methodologies and opportunities for interdisciplinary collaboration in 
language evolution research. But, unless one wants to say that a certain definition 
of language can be an obstacle to the investigation of its evolution, it is difficult to 
justify the claim that things would have been worse, or progress less marked, had 
there been more agreement on the nature of the object of study. It is more logical 
to suppose that things might have gone even better, although it is impossible to 
know. 
 The argument Wacewicz et al. (2020) use to show that a precise definition 
of language in the expression language evolution is unnecessary is based on the fact 
that the best known attempt to establish a terminology intended to favour the 
collaboration between disciplines and schools of linguistic thought in the field of 
the study of language evolution has been a failure, and that such a failure has not 
prevented these studies from flourishing. The authors refer, of course, to the 




faculty of language in the broad sense (FLB) and the faculty of language in the 
narrow sense (FLN). The reason why they suggest that the HFC proposal is a 
failure is that Chomsky, Fitch and Hauser would have defined the notion of FLN 
in a contradictory and inconsistent way in HCF and in Fitch et al. (2005; hence-
forth FHC). As argued in Wacewicz et al. (2020), what is relevant is that this 
incoherence has gone unnoticed in the field (except for Wacewicz et al. them-
selves), which would prove the irrelevance of precise definitions of the object of 
study in the field of language evolution research. 
 It would certainly be naive to think that we can have a “correct” definition 
of language. The same is true in any field of science: you do not need a universally 
accepted definition of life to study the origin of life, nor a universally accepted 
definition of natural species to study the origin of species (not to mention matter 
or energy). Yet shared assumptions about these objects are clearly needed if the 
sciences that study them are to be viable. In the absence of such assumptions, one 
cannot speak of biology or evolutionary theory in any grounded or meaningful 
way. There is no reason why (evolutionary) linguistics should be different here. 
 However, Wacewicz et al.’s central message seems to be that the (alleged) 
failure of the FLB/FLN terminology would have “freed” the study of language 
evolution from a restrictive conception of language, thus facilitating the pro-
liferation of new points of view and new opportunities for interdisciplinary coll-
aboration. 
 As I hope to show, it is not true that the definition of FLN is contradictory 
or inconsistent, nor is it true that terminological proposals, such as that of HCF, 
are irrelevant or unnecessary for the evaluation of real progress in research on 
language evolution. 
 
2. On the Definition(s) of FLN 
Wacewicz et al. imply that the HCF proposal intends to define language as FLN, 
that is, that HCF seeks to determine the FLN as the “authentic” object of study of 
language evolution research, rather than the whole FLB. But this is not so at all. 
In reality, HCF is not about language in general, but about the human faculty of 
language (FLB), a property or state of the human brain that allows us to learn and 
use languages. More specifically, HCF is a proposal on “unpacking FLB into its 
myriad component mechanisms” (Fitch et al. 2005: 181) with the aim of better 
understanding how these different components have been able to evolve, under 
the reasonable assumption that “profitable research into the biology and 
evolution of language requires fractionation of ‘language’ into component 
mechanisms and interfaces” (Fitch et al. 2005: 179). Whereas we can appreciate 
that the choice of the adjectives broad and narrow respond to a certain conception 
of language, in no way can it be suggested that in both articles language is defined 
as FLN, nor that it is implied that the study of the evolution of language should 
be limited to the study of FLN. In fact, the object of study from the biolinguistic 
point of view adopted by HCF cannot be other than FLB (that is, FL), and one of 
the aspects of this study is to determine what components it has, and whether 
FLN (a subset of FLB) really exists as such or not. Of course, it is true that 
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Chomsky and others have continued to use the word language to refer to this 
specific part of the FLB, instead of using the expression FLN, although Chomsky 
has also used computational system (Chomsky 1995) and basic property (Chomsky 
2016). Moreover, it is debatable whether something that does not include the 
sensorimotor component should still be called language (albeit in the narrow 
sense). In any case, we might note that using the word language to designate any 
of the components of language is not a sin exclusive to generative grammar. 
 Besides, it is not true, as stated in Wacewicz et al. (2020), that HCF and FHC 
offer two different definitions of FLN, and that they are incompatible: 
 
The proponents of FLN have defined it twice, in fundamentally 
discrepant ways: the definition originally formulated in Hauser et al. 
(2002) and the one later formulated in Fitch et al. (2005) describe two 
distinct entities (not simply different versions of the same entity). 
(Wacewicz et al., 2020: 64) 
 
In HCF, Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch propose that the FLN label should be 
reserved, by convention, for those components of the FL that (supposedly) are 
neither shared with other species (are specifically human) nor are part of other 
human cognitive domains (are language-specific); hence the use of the word 
narrow. Their hypothesis in HCF is that the FLN label should be reserved only for 
the computational component: “We propose in this hypothesis that FLN 
comprises only the core computational mechanisms of recursion as they appear 
in narrow syntax and the mapping to the interfaces” (Hauser et al. 2002: 1573), 
assuming, therefore, that only those elements meet the requirements to be 
included in that category. 
 What other definition of FLN appears in FHC that implies a different entity 
as a referent for FLN, or is in contradiction with the definition of HCF? None. 
 HCF reserves the term FLN for the computational component because its 
authors believe (as a hypothesis) that it is the only component of FLB that is 
specifically human and specifically linguistic. In FHC there is no change of 
reference or definition: the authors continue to maintain the same content of FLN. 
In fact, they discuss in detail why they think that the FL components that Pinker 
& Jackendoff (2005) (an article to which FHC is a response) also consider as 
specifically linguistic and human (certain aspects of human speech) are not part 
of FLN, but of FLB. 
 The supposed contradiction pointed out in Wacewicz et al. (2020) can be 
explained if we consider that the definition of FLN in HFC is extensional while the 
definition in FHC is intensional, but there is no inconsistency or contradiction. 
Actually, FHC alludes to this fact: “The term ‘FLN’ thus served dual duties in 
HCF” (Fitch et al. 2005: 182). Note that the intensional use of the term FLN is not 
new in FHC. In HFC the authors use it when commenting on Liberman’s 
approach: 
 
For example, Liberman and his associates […] have argued that the 




hence should be considered part of FLN. 
(Hauser et al. 2002: 1569, emphasis added) 
 
 In both texts there is the same terminological proposal (‘let us call FLN that 
which is specific to human language’) and the same empirical hypothesis (‘only 
the computational system is specific to human language, that is, FLN’). Why does 
HCF consider that the FLN is made up of the computational component? Because 
Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch stipulate that only the computational component is 
specific to human language, but not because there is some other inherent 
connection between the adjective narrow and the computational component of FL. 
If the definition criterion of FLN in HCF were not (human and linguistic) 
specificity, it would make no sense that other components of FL as different as the 
conceptual-intentional (CI) and the sensorimotor (SM) systems were grouped into 
what is not FLN. What groups CI and SM together against FLN is that they are 
(by hypothesis) neither specifically human nor specifically linguistic. Hence, they 
are part of FLB, but not of the FLN subset. So, the reasoning seems to be as follows: 
we think that the computational system is specific to human language; we want 
to call that which is specific to human language FLN; hence, the FLN is the 
computational system. 
 Wacewicz et al. (2020) illustrate their argument by citing the following texts 
as an example of contradiction: 
 
The contents of FLN are to be empirically determined, and could 
possibly be empty, if empirical findings showed that none of the 
mechanisms involved are uniquely human or unique to language, and 
that only the way they are integrated is specific to human language. 
The distinction itself is intended as a terminological aid to 
interdisciplinary discussion and rapprochement, and obviously does 
not constitute a testable hypothesis.      (Fitch et al. 2005: 181) 
 
Second, although we have argued that most if not all of FLB is shared 
with other species, whereas FLN may be unique to humans, this 
represents a tentative, testable hypothesis in need of further empirical 
investigation.            (Hauser et al. 2002: 1576) 
 
But in both texts Chomsky, Fitch and Hauser indicate that the content of FLN 
must be empirically determined (and that it is possible that it is an empty set). The 
statement in the text from 2002 that the FLN (extensionally identified as the 
computational component) is specific to human language is a hypothesis in need 
of further investigation; the naming of both sets of components as broad or 
narrow (which is what the end of the text from 2005 refers to) is obviously not a 
falsifiable hypothesis, but a terminological convention. There is no contradiction. 
 Wacewicz et al. point out that “[i]nterestingly, Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch 
themselves have never addressed the inconsistency and may even remain 
unaware of it” (2020: 66), which is not surprising if such inconsistency only exists 
in their own interpretation. Wacewicz et al. (2020: 68) affirm that the important 
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thing is not the possible inconsistency, but the fact that it went unnoticed, which 
would supposedly be an argument in favour of the irrelevance of “top-down” 
definitions of the object of study. The argument (insofar as it has any force) is not 
actually evaluable, because the absence of the perception of incongruity is easily 
explained considering that there is no incongruity. 
 Moreover, the influence that the terminological proposal has had in the field 
could be estimated, for example, through considering the number of citations of 
HCF, which, according to Wacewicz et al., “is doubtlessly among the most 
influential works in the field, and probably its most widely cited article” (2020: 
63). 
 
3. Applying the HCF Terminology: Speech, Communication, and the 
Language-Ready Brain 
The remainder of the article is a comprehensive and informative synthesis of the 
last ten years of research in language evolution, mostly that which does not use 
the HCF terminology. But since FLB/FLN is a terminological proposition, and not 
a theory of language, it is easy to see that it would have been very useful (or, at 
any rate, perfectly possible) to use it to classify and explain the four main lines of 
research (or models) that the authors consider, which are the following ones 
(including the main authors of each): 
 
(i) Language as a Multimodal Phenomenon (Kendon, McNeill, Zlatev)  
(ii) Language as a Complex Adaptive System (Steels, Kirby) 
(iii) Language as a form of social interaction (Tomasello, Levinson) 
(iv) Language in the Language-Ready Brain (Arbib, Bouchard, Boeckx and 
Benítez-Burraco) 
 
Model (i) identifies language with speech and gesture, and would therefore be a 
central part of the study of the evolution of the sensorimotor component (SM) of 
FL. 
 Model (ii) identifies language with languages and, in this sense, the model 
is not particularly interested in FL as a biological object, nor, therefore, in the 
evolution of its components.  
 Model (iii) identifies language with communication: The studies inspired 
by Tomasello and Levinson are studies of the evolution of communication, not so 
much of FLB itself. Such work would thus constitute a part of the investigation of 
the evolution of the relation between the CI and SM components of FLB, while 
they simply ignore the computational dimension of language (FLN). Actually, in 
model (iii) language is a “cultural artefact” inserted into basic human comm-
unication, which is what would have evolved. 
 Model (iv) invokes the notion of a language-ready brain. This notion can be 
interpreted in two ways: Either the brain first developed, through evolution, those 
properties that make it capable of producing human languages (Chomsky’s point 
of view), or languages developed as complex cultural objects and then they served 
as an adaptive environment for the evolution of the language-ready brain from a 




relevant parts of brain architecture and physiology (FLB) determine the 
distinctive properties of human language (and of human languages); in the 
second case, languages somehow externally developed this complexity and 
motivated the adaptations that would lead to the language-ready brain. In my 
opinion, the second version is highly implausible, although it is increasingly 
popular (as Wacewicz et al.’s report shows). 
 Actually, Arbib’s version of the language-ready brain notion also equates 
language with languages, since his notion of a language-ready brain presupposes 
the existence of languages in the environment, as a brain-independent 
phenomenon: 
 
What evolved (Evo) was a language-ready brain—not a brain with an 
innate mechanism encoding a universal grammar […] but rather one 
enabling a child to acquire language (Devo), but only if raised in a 
milieu in which language is already present, something which, it is 
claimed, required tens of millennia of cultural evolution after the 
emergence of Homo sapiens (Socio). 
 (Arbib 2018, apud Wacewicz et al., 2020: 83) 
 
Note that Arbib’s qualification of what evolved (a language-ready brain and not 
“a brain with an innate mechanism encoding a universal grammar”) is 
unnecessary, since, according to the HCF model of FLB (and according to the 
explicit model of Berwick and Chomsky 2016), there is no difference between, on 
the one hand, a brain programmed to develop a FLB and, on the other, a language-
ready brain. A brain that includes that which makes only humans capable of 
learning and using the languages that they use (as Arbib points out, “only the 
human brain is language ready”, Arbib 2012: ix, apud Wacewicz et al., 2020: 83) 
is already a brain that necessarily develops allowing the acquisition and use of 
human languages, that is, a brain with a FLB (including FLN). To put it more 
clearly: there is no difference (terminology aside) between a language-ready brain 
and a brain programmed to develop a FLB. 
 Thus, if the assumption that human languages precede the language-ready 
brain is not included, then the language-ready model is identical (except in detail) 
to Chomsky’s. This is the case with the version of the language-ready brain 
proposed by Benítez-Burraco and Boeckx. In fact, the explanation of the internal 
structure and evolution of the FLB is very similar in both cases: According to 
Wacewicz et al. (2020), in the language-ready brain approach to language 
evolution set out by Benítez-Burraco and Boeckx, language (its “core 
combinatorial operation” [i.e. FLN]) is the result of genetic mutations that alter 
the anatomy and physiology of the brain, while “[o]ther components of language, 
particularly, some forms of phonology and pragmatics, are assumed to predate 
this human specific innovation” [i.e. SM and CI, the other older components of 
FLB according to HCF]. In this model of the language-ready brain: 
 
[T]his freely combining merging ability is argued to be constrained via 
its interfacing with other cognitive systems and with the devices 
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involved in speech/gesture production. (Wacewicz et al., 2020: 85) 
 
A characterization not unlike Chomsky’s classic: 
 
We take L [a language] to be a generative procedure that constructs 
pairs […] that are interpreted at the articulatory-perceptual (A-P) and 
conceptual-intentional (C-I) interfaces.       (1995: 219) 
 
This language-ready brain model and Chomsky’s model are also similar in terms 
of the idea that language (apparently its “core combinatorial operation”) did not 
evolve for communication, but as a system of thought: 
 
One interesting and distinctive consequence is a conception of 
language primarily as a tool for thinking (rather than for 
communicating), since our language-readiness would have initially 
emerged as a new, improved mechanism of conceptualising. 
(Wacewicz et al., 2020: 87) 
 
This characterization is clearly reminiscent of the Chomskyan conception of FL 
and its evolution reflected in HCF, and developed in Chomsky (2007): “the earliest 
stage of language would have been just that: a language of thought, used 
internally” (Chomsky 2007: 13; see also Berwick & Chomsky 2011; 2016). As 
Chomsky has summarized more recently: 
 
Investigation of the design of language gives good reason to take 
seriously a traditional conception of language as essentially an 
instrument of thought. Externalization then would be an ancillary 
process, its properties a reflex of the largely or completely independent 
sensorimotor system. 
(Chomsky 2016: 73) 
 
 Apart from the fact that Benítez-Burraco & Boeckx’s approach to the 
evolution of the FLN (as presented in Wacewicz et al., 2020) is much more specific 
in biological and genetic aspects than that of Chomsky, it is evident that both 
models are variants of what is essentially the same theory of language. 
 Thus, the review of these four major research models of the evolution of 
language shows the usefulness of the HFC strategy of “fractionating FLB into 
several separate components, each of which might have different evolutionary 
histories” (Fitch et al. 2005: 205). 
 If it is not conceivable to give a coherent definition of language (and I agree), 
it is even less conceivable to speak of language evolution without further 
specification. The use of the expression language evolution without qualifying what 
language refers to implies, for example, that there is no clear distinction between 
the evolution of the organism that uses languages, and the historical change in the 







Wacewicz et al. (2020) argue that the absence of a restrictive definition of the object 
of study would be one of the causes of the progress that has been made in 
language evolution research, and they deny that the HCF initiative has had 
positive effects in that direction. This conclusion is based on the claim of an 
unnoticed inconsistency in the definition of FLN, but such an inconsistency does 
not exist. 
 Of course, it is possible that the absence of a hegemonic “top-down” 
definition of language has opened the door to more pluralistic and inter-
disciplinary research activity. But it does not seem (in light of the synthesis 
presented in Wacewicz et al, 2020) that we have sufficient perspective today to 
affirm that remarkable progress has been made over the last 10 years in the 
understanding of how the human faculty of language evolved. I tend to agree 
with Lewontin in that “[w]e know essentially nothing about the evolution of our 
cognitive capabilities, and there is a strong possibility that we will never know 
much about it” (Lewontin 1998: 109), although I do not fully share his attitude 
towards the achievements in the field of language evolution research:  
 
Reconstructions of the evolutionary history and the causal 
mechanisms of the acquisition of linguistic competence or numerical 
ability are nothing more than a mixture of pure speculation and 
inventive stories.              (Lewontin 1998: 111) 
 
 I have no doubt, in view of the valuable synthesis presented in Wacewicz et 
al. (2020), that the field of language evolution research is in good health and is 
bringing together important intellectual and economic efforts. But I do have 
doubts that the lack of a more uniform and specific definition of what evolved 
when language evolved is a positive aspect here. I see no reason to affirm that the 
abandoning of an explicit proposal of the division of labour and the avoidance of 
misunderstandings, as in the FLB/FLN terminological proposal, is an advantage; 
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